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U.C.C. Article Two Warranty Disclaimers
and the "Conspicuousness" Requirement of

Section 2-316
Under Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") section 2-314,I a warranty
that goods are "merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."' Among other
definitions, this means that the goods will be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."3 A warranty of merchantability is
implied in every contract for sale, "[uinless excluded or modified," 4 because the expectation that goods will be fit for their ordinary purpose "is
so commonly taken for granted that its exclusion from the contract is a
matter threatening surprise and therefore requiring special precaution."'
The special precaution referred to comes in the form of section 2-316. s
According to section 2-316(2), any attempt to "exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it" must: (1) mention
the term "merchantability" and (2) be "conspicuous" if made in writing."
Alternatively, one may achieve a disclaimer of all implied warranties by
compliance with section 2-316(3),' which contains three methods of excluding or modifying the implied warranties. The first method of exclusion is the use of phrases such as "with all faults" and "as is."' The test
of whether a phrase is sufficient is if "in common understanding [it] calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.C.C. § 2-314 (1962).
Id. § 2-314(1).
Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
Id. § 2-314(1).
Id, § 2-314 cmt. 11.

6. Id. § 2-316.
7. Id. § 2-316(2). Note that the conspicuous requirement applies only where there is a
writing. The language of the code permits the possibility of an oral disclaimer. It must also
meet, however, the first requirement of mentioning the word "merchantability." JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PRACTITIONER'S EDITION § 12-5
(3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
8. Note that this second method of disclaiming warranties would exclude not only the
implied warranty of merchantability of § 2-314, but also the implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose created by § 2-315 if such warranty arose from the circumstances of the
transaction.
9. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1962).
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there is no implied warranty."1 The second method of disclaiming a warranty under section 2-316(3) is by an inspection. 1 If, before entering into
the contract, the buyer examines the goods "as fully as he desire[s]," or if
the buyer has "refused to examine the goods," then no implied warranty
exists as to defects that "an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him.' 2 The third method of excluding or modifying an
implied warranty under section 2-316(3) is by course of dealing"s and usage of trade."
Though not explicitly required by the current text of Article 2, a majority of courts have taken the position that a written disclaimer that falls
under section 2-316(3)(a) must be "conspicuous."'" Georgia follows this
approach and requires a disclaimer under Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 11-2-316(3)(a)'O to be "conspicuous."' 7 In Leland Industries v. Suntek Industries,'$the language of an attempted disclaimer failed because it was not "conspicuous."'9 "Although, by its
terms, O.C.G.A. § 11-2-316(3)(a) does not explicitly require that the
'other language' be conspicuous, it has been interpreted as implicitly imposing such a requirement.1 20 White and Summers argue that this result
can be achieved by reading "conspicuous" into the phrase "calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion . . . and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty.' 1 The rationale behind requiring "conspicuous" disclaimers despite the Code's failure to explicitly require it is that other-

10. Id.
11. Id. § 2-316(3)(b).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 1,205(1). Course of dealing is defined as "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id.
14. Id. § 1-205(2).
15. WHITE & SUMMEfRS, supra note 7, § 12-5; see also Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale
Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1970). The court in CardinaleTrucking noted:
It does not make sense to require conspicuous language when a warranty is disclaimed by use of the words "merchantability" or "fitness" and not when a term
like "as is" is used to accomplish the same result. It serves no intelligible design to
protect buyers by conspicuous language when the term "merchantability" is used,
but to allow an effective disclaimer when the term "as is" is buried in fine print.

Id. at 352.
16. O.C.G.A § 11-2-316(3)(a) (1982).
17. Leland Indus. v. Suntek Indus., 184 Ga. App. 635, 638, 362 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1987);
see also White v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 158 Ga. App. 373, 280 S.E.2d 398 (1981).
18. 184 Ga. App. at 635, 362 S.E.2d at 441.
19. Id. at 638, 362 S.E.2d at 444.

20. Id.
21.

U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1962). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 12-6.
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wise, the conspicuousness requirement of section 2-316(2) is useless. 22 If a
disclaimer were to fail under section 2-316(2) for lack of conspicuousness,
then the same language could then be brought under section 2-316(3)(a),
where it would not be required to be "conspicuous" and where the drafters' intent of "protect[ing] the buyer from surprise"'" would be
frustrated.
I. PURPOSES OF THE "CONSPICUOUSNESS" REQUIREMENT
According to the comments accompanying section 2-316, the drafters
sought to "protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained for language of disclaimer."'24 This is accomplished by two means. First, when
there is language that tends to give rise to the existence of an express
warranty and other language that is inconsistent with the creation of an
express warranty, the two "shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other."' 5 Wherever such a construction of the inconsistent phrases is unreasonable, however, the words that create the warranty win out over the words that negate or limit the express warranty.'
Second, the U.C.C. attempts to protect a buyer from "unbargained language of disclaimer" by "permitting the exclusion of implied warranties
only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the
buyer from surprise.""
According to Anderson in his treatise on the U.C.C., the goal of section
2-316 is "initially to preserve the freedom of the contracting parties by
permitting them to allocate risk as they choose . .

objective, the objective.

. .

.

.Beyond this initial

is to avoid the surprise or fine print waiver of

22. See WoTE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 12-6; see also White v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan, 158 Ga. App. 373, 280 S.E.2d 398 (1981). "To hold that the 'as is' language need not
be conspicuous would allow the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to be annulled by implication by language less conspicuous than if they were directly eliminated, in
which case the effort to eliminate them would have failed [for inconspicuousness]." Id. at
373-74, 280 S.E.2d at 399-400.

23. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (1962).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 2-316(1).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 2-316 cmt. 1. Some courts rely upon the phrase "other circumstances which
protect the buyer from surprise" to justify giving effect to a warranty disclaimer despite a
lack of conspicuousness. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
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rights by the buyer."" Additional goals include certainty of proof, 2"longrun buyer protection, and avoidance of difficult questions of fact."
II.

THREE APPROACHES TO "CoNsPICUOUSNESS"

Currently there are three different approaches to the "conspicuousness" requirement of section 2-316(2): the objective test, the subjective
test, and the "modified objective test.

3s

It is this author's opinion that

because courts use these different approaches, the drafters of the U.C.C.
should redraft the current Code and expressly adopt one approach. The
individual state legislatures would then be free to either adopt this approach or to modify the Code in their states. The Permanent Editorial
Board has proposed revisions of Article 2, but the 1990 proposed draft
does not address the multiple interpretations of the Code's test for
conspicuousness."

The differing approaches stems from the language of section 1-201(10).'
and an apparent inconsistency with comment 10. According to section 1201(10), "conspicuous" is defined as follows:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that
a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated
term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not
is for decision by the court.-'

The phrase "against whom it is to operate" implies that the test should
be subjective rather than objective. At a minimum, it contemplates the
consideration of at least some subjective criteria.3 4 However, comment 10,
28. 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1983). Compare this with the goal of the Code's provision on "unconscionability" in § 2-302. "The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989)
(citation omitted).

29. Andrew M. Baker et al., Special Project: Article Two Warranties in Commercial
Transactions,64 CORNELL L. REv. 30, 182 (1978).
30. The name for the "modified objective test" in this regard is attributed to Cornell
University. See Debra L. Getz et al., Special Project: Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1271 (1987).
31. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2,

26-29 (1990). The Board discussed recommendations for changes in
the general definitions of § 1-201. No amendment is mentioned to address § 1-201(10).
PRELIMINARY REPORT

32. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1987).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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which accompanies section 1-201(10), suggests an objective approach.
"[The -text of section 1-201(10)] is intended to indicate some of the methods of making a term attention-calling. But the test is whether attention
can reasonably be expected to be called to it.""
The Objective Test of "Conspicuousness"

A.

Georgia currently uses the purely objective test of "conspicuousness."' 6
The objective test generally relies upon the text of section 1-201(10) and
focuses on the phrase "larger or other contrasting type or color.

'3 7

Courts

using this approach most often consider factors such as capitalization,"
the existence of a border around the disclaiming language, ss use of a large
type size for the disclaimer,4" the use of a heading above the disclaimer,41
and the contents of the disclaimer.'2 There is no ranking of the importance of any of these factors such that the existence of one would make
up for the absence of any other. However, it is apparent that the content
of a disclaimer is one factor that receives a large amount of weight, for
example, when the heading is misleading because it appears to create a
warranty rather than to exclude it.'3 In Leland Industries v. Suntek Industries," the court indicated that "[a] printed heading in [all] capitals
is conspicuous. ' 5 The sales slips contained a conspicuous heading
35.

U.C.C. § 1-201(10) cmt. 10 (1987).

36. See Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, 200 Ga. App. 348, 350-51, 408
S.E.2d 111, 114 (1991) (where the heading of the disclaimer was in large capital letters and
the entire disclaimer was blocked off with a border, "the printed language effectively precludes a claim for breach of implied warranty"); Webster v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 193
Ga. App. 654, 654, 389 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1989) (disclaimer "printed in type which is bolder and
larger than that generally used in the document, and [which) is further emphasized by the
capitalization and by being within a dark bordered rectangle ... is sufficiently conspicuous
to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 11-2-316(2)"); Steele v. Gold Kist, Inc., 186 Ga. App.
569, 570, 368 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1988) ("The combination of the capitalization of the disclaimer and its contents was sufficient to preclude an action against appellee for breach of
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.").
37. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1987).
38. Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, 200 Ga. App. 348, 350-51, 408 S.E.2d
111, 114 (1991).
39. Id. at 350-51, 408 S.E.2d at 114.
40. Webster v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 193 Ga. App. 654, 654, 389 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1989).
41. Leland Indus. v. Suntek Indus., 184 Ga. App. 635, 362 S.E.2d 441 (1987).
42. Steele v. Gold Kist, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 569, 570, 368 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1988) ("The
combination of the capitalization of the disclaimer and its contents was sufficient to preclude an action against appellee for breach of implied warranties . . ").
43. See Leland Indus. v. Suntek Indus., 184 Ga. App. 635, 637, 362 S.E.2d 441, 443
(1987).
44. 184 Ga. App. 635, 362 S.E.2d 441 (1987).
45. Id. at 637, 362 S.E.2d at 443.
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written in all capitals.4 "The conspicuous introductory language" stated
that the transaction was subject to "[AILL OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE FACE AND REVERSE SIDES HEREOF ....

47

The heading "Warranties" was on the reverse side of the document.' Although the disclaimer was marked by a heading written in all capitals and
therefore would ordinarily be conspicuous, the court concluded that it
was not conspicuous, in part because the effect of the language used was
unclear in terms of its effect as an exclusion of a warranty. 4" "'Several
sellers have attempted to satisfy the conspicuousness requirement by
printing only the heading of the combined express warranty and disclaimer clause in capital letters. When these headings have usually failed
to disclose the true nature of the clause, the Courts have denied effect to
the disclaimer.' "50
.B.

The Subjective Test of "Conspicuousness"

The subjective test relies upon the language "reasonable person against
whom it is to operate"' 1 for its legitimacy. Courts have differed on the
effect of the subjective awareness of a disclaimer. Some courts have taken
the position that where the disclaimer is written inconspicuously and
would ordinarily be ineffective pursuant to section 2-316(2) or section 2316(3)(a), proof of the buyer's knowledge of the disclaimer makes the disclaimer effective despite the literal language of the Code." This position
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

50. Id. (quoting

WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-

MERCIAL CODE § 12-5, p. 443 (1980)).
51. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1987).
52. See Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Wyo. 1989) ("[E]ven if [the
disclaimer] is inconspicuous, a disclaimer will become a part of the bargain if it is read or
acknowledged by the customer prior to purchase."); Twin Disc v. Big Bud Tractor, 772 F.2d
1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Because the district court found that [defendant] had actual
knowledge of [plaintiff's) warranty, the question of conspicuousness need not be reached.");
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 453, 457 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1984) (disclaimer given effect despite a lack of conspicuousness because it "came as no
surprise"); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 784-85 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(disclaimer not conspicuous because there was "only slightly contrasting print and [was]
without a heading adequate to call the buyer's attention to the disclaimer clause," but given
effect because "[plaintiff's] testimony establishes that the warranty disclaimers were neither
unexpected nor unbargained for, and that, consequently . .. they should be enforced.");
Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 403 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("The
conspicuousness requirement is not controlling here since defendant admits that he read
and was aware of the provision."); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428
F. Supp. 364, 375 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("[c]ommercial buyer's actual awareness and apparent
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is supported by reference to section 2-316 comment 1. The Code protects
a buyer from surprise of a disclaimer by "permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances
which protect the buyer from surprise.5 63 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals took this approach in South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co. v. Combustion Engineering,Inc.5 Although the disclaimer did not mention the
word "merchantability" and was not "conspicuous," 5 the court found
that the warranty was effectively disclaimed.ss "[T]he language of the disclaimer included in the warranty item came as no surprise to [plaintiff]
and [plaintiff] in fact bargained with [defendant] over a period of seven
''s7 The theory
months concerning it.
is that when the buyer has actual
knowledge of the disclaimer, he or she is not surprised.5s Since the goal of
the "conspicuousness" requirement has been met, there is no need to require a technical following of the Code.59 The court in Twin Disc v. Big
Bud Tractor" used the same theory:
Because the district court found that [defendant] had actual knowledge
of [plaintiff's] warranty, the question of conspicuousness need not be
reached. The purpose of the conspicuousness requirement is to protect
the buyer from unfair surprise. There is therefore no need to determine
endorsement of the [disclaimer] obviates any need for conspicuousness in order to prevent
surprise.").
53. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (1962) (emphasis added).
54. 322 S.E.2d 453 (S.C . Ct. App. 1984).
55. Id. at 457-58.
The disclaimer itself appears on page 17 of the agreement in the last sentence of a
two-paragraph item. It is indistinctive both as to color and as to type .... Moreover, the item containing the disclaimer is misleading in that it is suggestive of "a
grant of warranty rather than a disclaimer" because the heading of the item,
printed in underlined capital letters, simply reads "WARRANTY."
Id. at 456 (citing Hartman v. Jensen's Inc., 289 S.E.2d 648, 649 (S.C. Ct. App. 1982)).
56. Id. at 457-58.
57. Id. at 457.
58. Id.
59. See Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 403 N.E.2d 294 (II. App. Ct. 1980),
in which the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
The conspicuousness requirement is not controlling here since defendant admits
that he read and was aware of the provision. The purpose of the conspicuousness
requirement is to "protect the buyer from surprise" and "unexpected and unbargained [for) language of disclaimer[sl." This purpose is accomplished when the
buyer is actually aware of the seller's disclaimer.
Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
60. 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985).
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whether a disclaimer is conspicuous, such that the buyer's knowledge can
be inferred, when the buyer has actual knowledge of the disclaimer."
Other courts and commentators have taken the position that knowledge2
of the disclaimer does not make an inconspicuous disclaimer effective.
In Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,0 defendant-seller attempted to argue that plaintiff-buyer was not "surprised" by the disclaimer "because
[plaintiff] stated on deposition that he had read the contract, including
the disclaimer clause." ' 4 Even though the policy behind requiring disclaimers to be conspicuous had been satisfied, the court refused to give
effect to the disclaimer since it was not conspicuous. e The court adopted
the view that the code seeks not only to prevent "surprise," but also to
avoid the:
"'unconscionable' destruction of rights of buyers, it being stated that
any attempt to exclude or modify an implied warranty of
merchantability must use such terms, and, if in writing, must be conspicuous to the buyer, because it is unconscionable to permit general statements to destroy the buyer's right that the thing he purchases perform
properly." 6
The court in Rehurek takes the position that the minimum requirements
to satisfy the "conscionability" requirement 7 of the Code are those contained in section 2-316.18 Any variation from these would apparently be
unconscionable per se.
In Cate v. Dover," Justice Ray of the Texas Supreme Court addressed
in his concurrence in part, dissent in part, the rationale for ignoring the
subjective awareness of the disclaimer by the purchaser. He argued that a
buyer's knowledge should not be relevant to a decision whether a disclaimer is effective because sellers are then encouraged to make their dis61. Id. at 1335 n.3 (citations omitted). The court apparently takes the position that we
require "conspicuousness" in order to infer the buyer's knowledge of, and therefore his or

her assent to, the term in the contract.
62. Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see also
& ROsEaT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, STUDENT HORNBOOK
EDITION § 12-5 (3d ed. 1988) ("We think the drafters intended a rigid adherence to the
JAMES J. WHITE

conspicuousness requirement in order to avoid arguments concerning what the parties said
about warranties at the time of the sale. Thus we view with apprehension the growing number of decisions making buyer knowledge relevant to a disclaimer's conspicuousness.").
63. 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1972).
64. Id. at 455.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
677 (1983)).
67. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1962).
68. 262 So. 2d at 455.
69. 790 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1990).
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claimers conspicuous. 70 Disregarding the buyer's knowledge would enable

the court to avoid the difficult fact questions that arise regarding ACTUAL
awareness." "An absolute rule that an inconspicuous disclaimer is invalid, despite the buyer's actual knowledge, encourages sellers to make their
disclaimers conspicuous, thereby reducing the need for courts ' to evaluate
swearing matches as to actual awareness in particular cases.' 7
C.

The "Modified Objective"" Test of "Conspicuousness"

Relying on the phrase "reasonable person against whom it is to operate,' 7 4 some courts have chosen to consider a limited amount of subjec2
tive criteria in addition to the general factors of the objective test.'
These additional factors are the buyer's status as a consumer rather than
a commercial entity, the buyer's size and relative bargaining strength, and
the buyer's experience in the market. 6 The courts stop short of the subjective test, however, by refusing any inquiry as to whether the party
against whom the disclaimer is to operate possessed actual knowledge of
the disclaimer." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the modified
objective test in Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs Co.:' 8
Whether a disclaimer is conspicuous is not simply a matter of measuring the type size or looking at the placement of the disclaimer within the
contract. A reviewing court must ascertain that a reasonable person in
the buyer's position would not have been surprised to find the warranty

disclaimer in the contract. A factor to consider is the sophistication of

70. Id. at 567 (Ray, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. Id. (Ray, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
72. Id. (Ray, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
73. Getz, supra note 30, at 1271.
74. These factors are found in the U.C.C. § 1-201(10) definition of "conspicuousness."
75. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
76. See Logan Equip. Corp. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (D. Mass.
1990) ("Whether or not a term is conspicuous is a decision for the court. In making this
determination, the court takes into account the location of the clause, the size of the type,
any special highlighting, such as boldface, capitalization or underlining, the clarity of the
clause, and the sophistication of the contracting parties .... The parties to the contract
were not commercial innocents."); Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Co., 890
F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1989); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1980)
("Where the disclaimer is in a commercial transaction involving experienced businesspersons rather than a consume transaction involving ordinary purchasers, the concept of reasonableness under the circumstances depends on what a reasonable businessperson is expected to notice."); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 N.E.2d 583, 586-87 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1974) (among other factors leading to the court's determination that the disclaimer
was conspicuous, the court considered that "the 'person' against whom the limiting language
is to operate is a prominent, sophisticated entity").
77. Baker, supra note 29, at 186.
78. 890 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the parties. ... Also relevant as to whether a reasonable person would
have noticed a warranty disclaimer are the circumstances of the negotiation and signing.7 9
III. Is THERE A REQUIREMENT THAT THE BUYER HAVE ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE DISCLAIMER IN ORDER. TO BE EFFECTIVE?
Some courts indicate that a disclaimer is not effective if it is not actually brought to the attention of the buyer.80 In Hiigel v. General Motors

Corp.,"1 for example, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that a general

policy existed against permitting "general disclaimer language" to negate

implied warranties."' While the court had previously enforced such
clauses in transactions between commercial parties, they did not choose
to do so in a consumer sale unless the buyer had actual knowledge of the

disclaimer:
[Ajlthough a general disclaimer clause may negate implied warranties if
there is a negotiated contract between a commercial seller and a commercial buyer, it is not appropriate to a consumer sale. This is so unless
it is shown that "the so-called disclaimer was clearly brought to the attention of the buyer and agreed to by him .... ,83

Recently, courts have ignored cases that made actual knowledge an absolute requirement for an effective disclaimer.'

In Stauffer Chemical Co.

79. Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
80. Twin Disc v. Big Bud Tractor, 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985). The court held a disclaimer effective despite its lack of conspicuousness because the buyer had actual knowledge
of the disclaimer and therefore was not surprised. The court noted that "[tihere is therefore
no need to determine whether a disclaimer is conspicuous, such that the buyer's knowledge
of disclaimer can be inferred, when the buyer has actual knowledge of the disclaimer." Id. at
1335. The Seventh Circuit apparently takes the position that the buyer must have actual
knowledge of a disclaimer for it to be effective. When actual knowledge is not shown, the
code requires "conspicuousness" in order to infer the buyer's knowledge. See also Zabriskie
Chevrolet v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1968). In Zabriskie Chevrolet, the disclaimer was ineffective due to lack of conspicuousness since it was "in fine print on the back
of the [document]." Id. at 198. However, the court noted that "[t]he evidence is plain that
the terms of these attempted disclaimers and limitations of warranties were not actully
brought to defendant's attention nor explained to him in detail." Id.; see also Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
81. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
82. Id. at 989-90.
83. Id. at 989-90 (quoting Cherokee Inv. Co. v. Voiles, 166 Colo. 270, 274, 443 P.2d 727,
729 (1968) (decided under the Uniform Sales Act rather than the Uniform Commercial
Code; the relevant section required a showing of actual knowledge of the disclaimer by the
buyer in order for it to be effective)).
84. See Stauffer Chem. Corp. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1972) ("[T]here is no requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code that [buyers] have had actual knowledge of seller's
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v. Curry," the court noted "two distinct requirements for an effective disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability."' The disclaimer
must mention "merchantability," and if written it must be conspicuous. 7
Actual knowledge of the disclaimer is not required." "If the disclaimer is
in writing and is conspicuous, there is no requirement that the customer
actually read or acknowledge the disclaimer in order for it to become a
part of the bargain.""
IV. Is

THERE A REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE
DISCLAIMER BE "UNDERSTANDABLE"?

The concept of "conspicuousness" may incorporate "understandability"
as one of its factors. 0 In Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba Geigy, 1 the court
evaluated a disclaimer contained in a booklet attached to each container
of an herbicide. The disclaimer was in bold type and appeared on a page
immediately after the booklet's table of contents.2 The court stated the
disclaimer was effective because the disclaimer was "clear and conspicuous and one that a reasonable person would have noticed and understood."' 98 Also, in Wagaman v. Don Warner Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,' 4 the
court addressed the issue of understandability. The court noted that
"[w]hether or not an exclusion or modification must be understandable,
burying the same in a profusion of words may operate to hide and make
it inconspicuous." 5 The court, however, gave effect to the disclaimer because once the buyer's attention was directed to the paragraph with large
print, "a little time and patience unravels [the] meaning."" The court
considered the same issue in Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Division,
disclaimer of warranties of merchantability and fitness in order to make them effective, so
long as the disclaimer is in writing and conspicuous."); WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, §
12-5.
85. 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989).

86. Id. at 1091.
87. Id. at 1092.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy, 708 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Div., Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 759 (D. Kan. 1985);
Wagaman v. Don Warner Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1604 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1981); Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
91. 708 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
92. Id. at 710.
93. Id.
94. 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1604 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1981).
95. Id. at 1606.
96. Id. at 1606-07.
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The court concluded that the disclaimers were

"clearly conspicuous .. .[in part because] [thhe language is clear and
concise."gs
V.

U.C.C. DEFINITION OF "CONSPICUOUSNESS"

AND THE MAGNUSSON-

MOSS WARRANTY ACT

Currently, there is not a definition of the word "conspicuous" as used
in the Magnusson-Moss" Warranty Act. 00 According to section
2304(a)(3)' 0 1 of the Act, a "warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or implied warranty on [a]
product, unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the
face of the warranty. '"' The federal district court in Virginia in Callas v.
Trane, faced the lack of a definition for "conspicuous" in MagnussonMoss. 0 3 The court chose to apply the U.C.C. definition by analogy.104 The
author considers this approach to be reasonable and, therefore, likely to
be followed by other courts faced with the same issue. However, in light
of the competing interpretations of the approach to be taken under the
U.C.C., different results will be obtained on similar facts based solely on
which state's substantive law applies to the case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the various approaches that have been taken to define "conspicuous," the U.C.C. definition should be redrafted when Article 2 is next revised so that a uniform test will be created. The U.C.C. should correct the
internal inconsistency between the text of section 1-201(10) and comment
10 regarding whether an objective or subjective approach should be applied; or the editorial board might consider a "modified objective" test as
is recommended by Cornell University.105
It is a worthy goal to protect the unsophisticated consumer from the
harsh result of boilerplate language of disclaimer while holding the sophisticated consumer or commercial enterprise bound to its agreement.
As the Code stands right now, it is uncertain whether or not the courts
97. 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 759 (D. Kan. 1985).
98. Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
100. Callas v. Trane CAC, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 72, 73 (W.D. Va.1990).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1988).
102. Id.
103. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 72 (W.D. Va. 1990).
104. Id. at 73-74.
105. Getz, supra note 30. "We continue to advocate i modified objective test to determine the conspicuousness of a disclaimer." Id. at 1271-72.
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are free to consider the level of buyer sophistication. I' The inconsistency
between the text of section 1-201(10) and its comment 10 have resulted in
sometimes strained interpretations to achieve what appears to be a socially desirable result. This can be remedied by merely amending section
1-201(10) to account for these factors. The subjective test may be too lenient if it is held to require actual knowledge of the disclaimer. In the
extreme case, both the intentionally blind consumer and the convincing
liar are rewarded at the expense of a business that has in good faith indicated to the consumer that its, product is disclaiming implied warranties.
Likewise, the purely objective test may result in inequities in the exact
opposite direction. It would permit boilerplate language that may be extremely confusing and require an unrealistic amount of legal knowledge 07
in order to be understood to disclaim a warranty of merchantability that
is "so commonly taken for granted that its exclusion from the contract is
a matter threatening surprise and therefore requiring special precaution."'"8 The only requirement to effectiveness would be assuring that the
language is in capitals or dark print.
The drafters were fully aware that consumers expect some minimum
standard of quality when they purchase an item, as evidenced by the enactment of section 2-314. To permit the implied warranty of
merchantability to be excluded against a consumer who lacks the sophistication to understand the legal effect of the rights being disclaimed
would seem to require consumers to either enroll in law school or consult
an attorney every time they make a purchase of goods. Even more unrealistic in light of consumer shopping patterns is to expect that a consumer
will take the time to even read a warranty term before making a
purchase. The often complex terminology used in a disclaimer, not to
mention the difficulty aid time involved in procuring the warranties of
competing goods and reading these while shopping, is certain to act as a
deterrent to reading the terms for all but the most dedicated of
purchasers.
These are mere generalizations, however, and do not apply in every
case. There are certain to be purchasers who are capable of understanding
the legal effect of a disclaimer. This is true not only of an attorney, but
also of a commercial entity making a purchase in which the person authorizing the purchase either involves its attorneys or has great knowledge of both the item being purchased and any substitute goods. However, it is not true in all cases that even a large corporation is going to
106.

Buyer sophistication is permitted under the subjective test as well as the "modified

objective" test, but it is not relevant under the pure objective test.
107. It is an unrealistic goal to expect the bulk of society to possess more than a very
basic understanding of the law of Sales.
108. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 11 (1962).
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give detailed consideration to the warranty terms of an item it purchases.
This would be especially true when the item is a relatively inexpensive
item that might be purchased infrequently or by a lower-level employee. 10' Additionally, a purely private consumer is more likely to seek
legal advice or perform comparison shopping that would include warranty
comparisons when the relative value of the good is great. The purchase of
an $11 toaster is not likely to provoke a consumer to study its warranty
terms; although a $15,000 car is likely to provoke such a response.
There are two reasons that justify placing the burden on the seller or
manufacturer rather than on the purchaser to establish knowledge, or at
least a reasonable inference of knowledge, that a disclaimer formed part
of the basis of the bargain. The first reason is that a seller is in the best
position to bring the clause to the attention of the purchaser. The ideal
situation in contracting is a complete "meeting of the minds" between the
buyer and seller. When the seller takes the time to inform the buyer of a
warranty disclaimer, their minds are sure to have met absent any reason
to expect that the purchaser does not comprehend what has been told to
him or her. When a face to face meeting between the buyer and seller
does not occur, the seller is in a position to see to it that the warranty
terms appear in clear, understandable language in a location that is likely
to be seen by the purchaser.110 This minimizes the likelihood that the
purchaser will make an uninformed purchase and thus minimizes the risk
of unfair surprise."'
The second reason that justifies placing the burden upon the seller or
manufacturer to bring a disclaimer to the attention of the purchaser is
that it ultimately may result in manufacturers producing higher quality
goods. When a manufacturer chooses to voluntarily produce an inferior
quality good, placing the disclaimer of any warranty in a place where it is
most likely to be noticed by the consumer such as near the price, and
requiring the use of language that can be understood by most, or alternatively requiring any salespersons to bring actual attention to the warranty
disclaimer when practical, will result in more educated purchasing. If the
manufacturer's warranty is not sufficient to satisfy the consumer that a
good will perform to his or her liking, then the consumer will not
purchase it. This will, theoretically, cause the market value of that good
to decrease until it reaches a point at which the purchasers feel that the
109. Presumably, a purchase that requires approval by an executive of the company
would be of such magnitude that attorneys or experts on the item would be involved and,

therefore, an informed decision would be made.
110. The author suggests placing any disclaimer at or very near the price since this is
probably the most closely scrutinized portion of the package.
111. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (1962) ("permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only

by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise").
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risk they take with inferior goods or warranties is justified by the cost
savings. If the selling price is too low to be profitable for the manufacturer, then it will be forced to increase its quality or its warranty in order
to attract new customers. In any event, the buyer is protected from surprise and presumably higher quality goods are produced. The result is
beneficial to both consumers and manufacturers. Consumers benefit by
receiving higher quality goods, which is what they generally expect when
making a purchase. The manufacturer also benefits from the production
of higher quality goods. They are able to offer better warranty terms to
the customer, which can be an attractive' selling point if the purchasers
are aware of this. Yet the cost of this better warranty will be minimal
since the higher quality goods are less likely to utilize the warranty.
In light of these considerations, the Permanent Editorial Board should
adopt a "modified objective" test for conspicuousness. In addition to the
factors relevant to the purely objective test,'12 the Board should consider
the commercial sophistication of the buyer, the relative value of the goods
purchased, and the understandability of the terms used in the disclaimer.
Consumers make purchases with an expectation that the goods are generally going to perform and be of a certain level of quality. It is certainly
reasonable to uphold this expectation whenever possible. It would be unreasonable to deny the buyer the benefit of the bargain as he or she reasonably expects it to be when the seller knows, or from the circumstances
should have known, that the buyer would not know of or understand the
disclaimer. While actual knowledge should certainly suffice to satisfy the
"conspicuousness" requirement, this requirement should also be satisfied
when the circumstances of the transaction are such that an expectation
that the goods are warranted is unreasonable. For example, the expectation of a warranty is unreasonable when the price of the item is appreciably lower than its market value.
BERNARD
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See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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